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BINDING STATUTORY EARLY OFFERS BY
DEFENDANTS, NOT PLAINTIFFS, IN PERSONAL
INJURY SUITS
Jeffrey O'Connell* & Evan Stephenson**

INTRODUCTION

For some time now, the senior author has advanced an alternative
to the current tort system in personal injury cases, including claims of
medical malpractice.1 The alternative is defined in the following way:
A defendant would have statutory power to make a binding statutorily defined "Early Offer" to pay the plaintiff's net economic losses as
they accrue. 2 If a defendant makes such an offer, the plaintiff can
only proceed to trial by rejecting the offer, but to recover full common
grossly neglaw damages the plaintiff must then prove the defendant's
3
doubt.
reasonable
a
beyond
ligent misconduct
When promoting this early offers alternative, the senior author has
been met with misgivings about the defendant's ability to bind the
plaintiff-victim in this manner. Why, one might ask, should the alleged wrongdoer be given so much unilateral power over the plaintiff's claim? A fair question. We seek here to resolve this concern by
* Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A., Dartmouth College,
1951; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1954.
** B.A., George Mason University, 2002; J.D. expected, University of Virginia Law School.,
2005.
1. See generallyJeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373 (2002); Jeffrey
O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, If Second Best, Alternative
to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858 (1999); Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault &
Quasi-Criminal Liability, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (1992); Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That
Can't Be Refused: Foreclosureof PersonalInjury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1982) [hereinafter O'Connell, Offers That
Can't Be Refused].
2. See O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, supra note 1, at 601-04.
3. Early Offers for Medical Injury Act § 3 [hereinafter Early Offers Act] (unenacted model
act, on file with the DePaul Law Review) (providing that a claimant may pursue a cause of
action subsequent to a valid early offer "against the health provider for injury but only if it can
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt" that the provider "was guilty of wanton or intentional
misconduct in causing the injury"). For the terms of other bills incorporating the early offers
idea, see S. 1861, 104th Cong. (1996) (introduced by Senator Mitch McConnell (R.-Ky.); Mass.
House Bill no. 5700 (May 1986) (introduced by then-Governor Michael Dukakis (D.-Mass.);
H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. (1985) (introduced by then-Congressman Richard Gephardt (D.-Mo.)).
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explaining how an early offers statute is like judo: it turns the plaintiffs' strengths to the advantage of defendants and to the advantage of
plaintiffs when there are arguably meritorious claims. 4 An early offers law greatly reduces the wide range of possible negative bargaining
outcomes for such plaintiffs, along with some favorable possibilities,
and replaces them with a desirable and sensible insurance result: an
immediate and binding guarantee of payment for net economic losses
as they accrue. The corporate defendant's risk aversion and its capacity for self-interested calculation encourage it to remove the dispute
from the risky, costly, dilatory, and wasteful world of tort claims and
to earn that exit by promptly compensating plaintiffs with arguably
meritorious claims for their actual economic losses.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the early offers alternative.
Part III explains why the current system has not led to the desirable
results that an early offers law would encourage. Part IV demonstrates that under a "reverse" early offers system-in which plaintiffs
have the power to bind defendants with early offers to pay the plaintiffs' net economic losses-the plaintiff has little or no incentive to
differentiate between arguably meritorious and clearly non-meritorious claims. Part V advances evidence put forth elsewhere that supports the admittedly controversial proposition that, even if a system
existed in which binding early offers by plaintiffs entailed their incentive to distinguish between meritorious and non-meritorious claims,
individual plaintiffs (even with the assistance of sophisticated counsel)
cannot be expected to make this distinction as well as corporate decisionmakers. In particular, the theory goes, because corporate decisionmakers face the discipline of accountability to markets within and
without their companies, and because corporations diversify their
decisionmaking processes, their choices are less likely to suffer as
greatly from the cognitive biases which afflict individuals, especially
injured ones. Part VI iterates that when defendants make early offers,
they do so to the advantage of plaintiffs over the uncertain, costly, and
protracted process of demanding compensation through litigation. An
early offers statute seeks to enlist the strengths of defendant-corporations in the service of legitimate plaintiff-victims.
II.

EARLY OFFERS:

A

BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Under an early offers statute, all disputes remain at the outset in the
current tort system. The plaintiff files a claim (very often with the
4. Broadly viewed, early offers are not as zero-sum as martial arts. But for purposes of addressing the charge of prodefendant one-sidedness, the analogy fits.

2005]

BINDING EARLY OFFERS BY DEFENDANTS

235

help of a lawyer), presumably for economic and non-economic damages, with the lawyer exacting a contingent fee. The early offers plan
thereupon gives the defendant a fixed time period (e.g., 180 days) during which it may remove the claim from the current tort system by
making an early offer. The early offer amount is statutorily defined
and calculated. The defendant simply offers to pay what the statute
determines-namely, the plaintiff's net economic loss as it accrues,
plus reasonable plaintiff's attorney's fees (e.g., a pre-defined presumption by statute of ten percent of the current value of the payment
due). Nothing is payable for non-economic damages such as pain and
suffering.
Net economic loss generally includes medical and rehabilitation expenses necessitated by the disputed injury (not already compensated
5
by the plaintiff's own insurance), and, for example, eighty percent of
6
lost wages that cannot be avoided through mitigation. If the defendant makes such an early offer to pay uncompensated economic loss,
the claim exits the current tort system in one of two ways: the plaintiff
either (1) accepts the offer, receives the statutorily defined compensation as losses accrue, 7 and the tort claim is settled; or (2) the plaintiff
rejects the offer, thereby retaining the right to seek both economic
and non-economic damages, but in order to recover must prove the
defendant's wanton or intentional misconduct beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 If the defendant makes no early offer, the current system remains in place in its entirety, including the possibility of seeking all
non-economic damages such as pain and suffering as well as punitive
damages. In the case of seriously injured claimants with minimal net
economic losses, an early offer from a defendant must be a minimum
of $250,000.
An early offers law might seem at first blush to empower defendants disproportionately over the claims of plaintiffs. To some, this will
smack of injustice. The defendant can unilaterally eliminate the plaintiff's ability to obtain pain and suffering damages, except in extraordinarily egregious cases; such as, in clear cases of gross negligence.
5. See Early Offers Act, supra note 3, §§ 2(h), 2(i)(1)-(2) (including medical expenses, and
placing limitations on the definition of medical expenses); (j) (including rehabilitation); (n) (excluding from early offers the plaintiff's own medical insurance coverage). Payment for more
than net economic loss frequently amounts to a violation of the principle of indemnity, on which
the proper functioning of insurance rests. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981
U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 344-48, 366-67.

6. Early Offers Act, supra note 3, §§ 2(h)(i)-(ii).
7. Id. § 4(a).
8. Id. § 3.
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Since defendants would only make such offers if they lessened the
expected payout, plaintiffs with arguably valid claims would seem to
be made worse off from the point of view of expected payoff, whereas
if the plaintiff's claim is weak, the defendant need not make an offer.
That looks like a win-win for the defense. Thus, an early offers law
might seem to provide defendants with a one-sided option at the
plaintiff's expense.
But this zero-sum view, we contend, is inaccurate. Early offers will
indeed improve the position of defendants, but by no means necessarily to the detriment of plaintiffs. The early offers plan seeks to refute
the preconception that anything good for defendants is bad for plaintiffs and vice versa. True, defendants' early offers can lower plaintiffs'
probability of receiving greater awards so drastically that litigation is
practically pointless. But plaintiffs gain too: plaintiffs' risks are cut
short along with defendants'. True, plaintiffs lose their chance at compensation for pain and suffering, but they gain by the elimination of
uncertainty, delay in payment, high transaction costs, and the inevitable frustration associated with litigation. One cannot overstate the
value to injured victims of the peace of mind that accompanies a guarantee of essential payment, with no significant delay, and with no
costly process of prolonged and often bitter lawsuits. As an extra advantage, in an early offers world plaintiffs receive all the compensation determined by the statute, since plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are paid
by the defendant in addition to net economic loss. Nor would it be
only cases with a high probability of plaintiff success where the early
offer would be made. Given the high costs when an offer is not
made-duplicating collateral sources, high transaction costs on both
sides, and payment for pain and suffering-the incentives to make
early offers will extend to many more than just the worst cases. One
leading malpractice lawyer has opined that if an early offers bill were
passed, he would advise making an early offer in 200 of the 250 cases
that his large multi-city office was then defending.9

III.

THE INCAPACITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM TO REPLICATE
THE EARLY OFFERS RESULT

If early offers can provide so many benefits to both plaintiffs and
defendants, one might ask: Why don't adverse parties now reach the
early offers result on their own? After all, under present law, either
party can make an offer to settle for the claimant's net economic
9. Interview with William Ginsburg, Esq., in Durham, North Carolina (Apr. 15, 1986).
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loss.1 0 A pertinent question, then, is why a statute is needed to encourage such settlements.
Even though, as we contend, the optimal resolution of many personal injury claims is prompt payment of a claimant's net economic
loss, today neither defendants nor plaintiffs are at all inclined to make
such offers. In the first place, without a statute, neither plaintiffs nor
defendants can negate the right of any collateral source to
subrogation.
Much more importantly, the defendant may be confident of defeating or at least wearing down claimants, given the difficulties and delays in proving a tort claim. The long delay before trial often enables
defendants to bargain down even claimants clearly entitled to tort
damages because they need immediate money for medical bills and
wage loss.11 Delaying procedural tactics also are2 used to lessen the
value of the contingent fee of plaintiffs' counsel.' Furthermore, defendants will fear that an early offer to settle for claimants' net economic loss will be seen as a signal of weakness and simply encourage
claimants and their lawyers to seek an even larger settlement than
originally sought. This mirrors the position of plaintiffs and their
counsel who similarly fear that an early offer to settle only for ecoresulting in
nomic loss would be deemed an admission of weakness
13 Thus, even if
sought.
either no payment or less than that otherwise
defendants were to make such an offer, claimants could be expected
to reject it. Defendants also must normally sweeten any settlement
claimants' legal
offer for actual losses by at least one-third to cover
14 In addition, depockets.
own
fees, lest they come out of claimants'
fense attorneys, paid by the hour with additional payment for days in
court, often seek to settle cases only after a jury is sworn in so they
15 As a result, defendants may fail to
can collect an additional fee.
offer a prompt settlement for a claimant's net economic loss even
when it is seemingly advantageous to do so.
the twin
10. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 155 (discussing
offer").
"maximum
defendant's
the
and
ask"
concepts of the claimant's "minimum
with low
11. See id. at 156 (stating that defense attorneys can take advantage of "plaintiffs
at which the case is
income and the uninsured . . . by using various tactics to delay the date
resolved").
if the claim
12. See id. at 78 (indicating that "the best return on the lawyer's investment occurs
settles quickly").
J. ECON. 198
13. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND
(1987).
REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSUR14. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE

14, 45 (1971).
15. Id.

ANCE
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Workers' compensation and auto no-fault laws have avoided these
troublesome dilemmas by forcing both parties to accept the disposition of claims for only claimants' economic losses regardless of either
party's fault. However, a sweeping no-fault solution seems infeasible
for medical malpractice (as well as products liability) claims in light of
the difficulty of defining the insured events. 16 Thus, the only way to
prevent a rejection of settlements for net economic loss is to allow one
party the capacity to require the other party to accept such a
settlement.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS (AND THEIR COUNSEL) LACK INCENTIVES TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MERITORIOUS AND
NON-MERITORIOUS

CLAIMS

Even granting that plaintiffs and defendants both gain from an early
offers system, why should the defendant be the one with power to
bind the plaintiff? If the plaintiff and defendant gain so much, perhaps the plaintiff should have the power to make a binding early offer
for payment of net economic loss by the defendant. In that connection, let us assume something like the mirror image of the proposed
early offers law: A plaintiff may offer to accept net economic loss as it
accrues; if the defendant rejects the offer, the defendant must prove
that it was non-negligent beyond a reasonable doubt. One could label
this a "reverse" early offers plan.
If claimants could force defendants to settle, many claimants could
be expected to make almost random claims and realistically expect to
extract at least some payment from a defendant (more on this in a
moment). Furthermore, any screening device to separate arguably
meritorious from non-meritorious tort claims would undoubtedly be
almost as cumbersome as the present system. In fact, such screenings
are already a large part of the present system, with motions to dismiss
supposedly unmeritorious claims commonplace; nevertheless, the tide
of tort litigation rolls along. 17
To pursue why a "reverse" early offers plan would not work, note
that plaintiffs and their counsel would simply lack sufficient incentives
to weed out frivolous or non-meritorious claims under such a plan. Of
course, potential plaintiffs and counsel want to maximize compensation (just as defendants want to minimize it). As the recipient of compensation, a plaintiff cannot be expected to act against self-interest by
16. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, supra note 1, at 597 n.42.
17. For an example of a statutory screening device in medical malpractice cases, see
CODE ANN. § 34-18-1 et seq. (Michie 1973).

IND.
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declaring the claim to be non-meritorious. In a system in which plaintiffs may unilaterally bind defendants, the predominant 8safeguard
against frivolous claims would only be claimants' honor.' Defendants' treasuries would be largely left ajar.
Imagine a patient with an ear infection that has grown steadily
worse. The patient has incurred considerable costs in treatment and
has run short of funds. The patient knows that by making an early
offer to the treating physician, a distinct likelihood of payment for net
economic loss arises. What incentive do such patients have to ask
themselves hard questions about such a claim? Did the treatment
In
cause the condition to worsen? Was the treatment negligent?
other words, how much merit under substantive tort law does this
claim have? The patient with the ear infection has little or no reason
to probe any of these questions. Unlike defendants, individual plaintiffs have an incentive to be thoroughly satisfied when their own frivolous or meritless claims are paid. The power to bind a defendant
unilaterally would create a perverse incentive to exploit the system
with marginal claims or worse.
Even if defendants as the entity making payment normally want to
constrains depay the smallest amount feasible, the early offers law
19 The defendant
fendants' ability to make unfair "low-ball" offers.
must make the minimum payment required (net economic loss) in orconder to forestall the plaintiff's further pursuit of a claim. When
to
desire
fronted with particularly meritless claims, defendants will
pay nothing and will make no offer-as they should. But when faced
with arguably meritorious claims, they will minimize their risk by testing whether making the statutorily defined early offer involves less
exposure than a full scale tort suit with all its uncertainty and transaction costs. The defendant alone must distinguish carefully between
arguably meritorious and clearly non-meritorious claims as a way of
reducing costs by prompt payment of the specified benefits.
As another rationale for placing the responsibility for the early offer in the hands of the defendant, note that the defendant has greater
access to information regarding liability. Plaintiffs (and their attorneys) have an adverse outcome they can cite but they are often fishing
for whatever fault existed, perhaps especially in medical malpractice
cases. Defendants, however, have full and ready access to the records
and to the individuals that allegedly engaged in the substandard praclargely preserve the
18. In my opinion, screening devices are limited in their effectiveness and
current fault-based system.
19. See Early Offers Act, supra note 3, § 3.
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tice. They are better positioned to make a relatively quick assessment
of the value of the claim.
From another perspective, placing the early offer in defendants'
hands also makes sense because the ball is after all in the defendants'
"court." They are expected to "return serve" anyway,
so an early offer by defendants seems a natural progression in the adjudication
20
process.

V.

ARE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS LESS AFFECTED BY COGNITIVE
BIASES THAN INDIVIDUAL

CLAIMANTS AND

THEIR COUNSEL?

Under an admittedly more controversial theory, consider the following: Arguably plaintiffs should not be granted unilateral power to
bind because, even if they did have an incentive to ferret out nonmeritorious claims, they cannot be expected to calculate the costs versus the benefits of paying claims nearly as well as defendant insurance
companies. Claimants' capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of
paying early offer claims is not anywhere equal to that of defendants.
Psychologists and behavioral economists claim that individuals fall
prey to certain cognitive biases in their judgment.21 These biases affect people non-uniformly.2 2 They vary across cultures, educational
groups, and gender, and from person to person. 23 But even so, a corporate entity probably suffers less from emotional cognitive biases
than individual plaintiffs (and even their lawyers). Insurance companies as a group tend to be less quixotic in their reasoning than idiosyncratic tort victims. Their decisionmaking is diversified among many
experienced hands. Overlapping decisionmaking in business tends to
discipline every link in the chain of command for mistakes that diminish company value.2 4 Companies are thereby institutionally better
suited to overcoming biases in judgment than already anguished tort
victims, with no recourse to others besides their own lawyers (more on
the role of plaintiffs' lawyers in a moment).
20. For these last two points in the text concerned with the appropriateness of
putting the
initiative on defendants, I am grateful to Tom Hafemesiter of the Institute of Law,
Psychiatry
and Public Policy at the University of Virginia (although he is not responsible for
the thrust of
this whole Article).
21. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' PerfectRationality Should Not
Be Traded
for BehavioralLaw and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 82 (2002).
22. See id. at 86-87.
23. Id. at 87.
24. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288,
289, 292-96 (1980).
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Gregory Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Law and Psychology at
Florida State University, observes that "[r]esearch from psychology
and behavioral economics studies reveals that human judgment and
mechadecisionmaking necessarily rely on imperfect psychological
'2 5 Professor
nisms that cause systematic departures from rationality.
Mitchell concludes that "individuals differ greatly in their propensities
in their propensities
to act rationally and that situations differ greatly
' 26 From individuals, he
to elicit rational behavior from individuals.
argues, one can by no means expect stable and predictable rationality.27 Variations in rationality are individual and situational: People
differ from each other, and the same person reasons differently in al28 Mitchell focuses on the importance of both
ternative situations.
emotions and accountability.
Perhaps the most important individual variations for tort settlediments are differences in emotions. Any given person's judgment
2 9 "As
state:
verges depending on one's emotional (read "affective")
one's affective state changes, so may the nature of one's cognitive
processing and goals; conversely, the decisions' 30 one makes may have
profound effects on one's own affective state." Psychologists associate "negative mood states" with inducement of systematic and dataon the other hand, induce heurisdriven thinking. 31 Positive moods,
33 One would expect the bargaining
32
tic or theory-driven reasoning.
posture of both positive and negative feelings on the part of plaintiffs
in, say, medical malpractice situations to vary. An overly optimistic
plaintiff34 might rely on a heuristic in which injured people are more
likely to win than they really are, and insist on proceeding to the jury
35
so
rather than settling. Others with claims of similar merit will not
results.
divergent
to
decide, and the disparity will contribute
25. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 70-71 (2002).
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 75-76.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 73, 98-101.
30. Id. at 99.
31. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 100.
by early experience that does
32. "Heuristic" refers to a problem-solving technique ingrained
needing further empiriproof,
to
resistant
not give rigorously accurate results. It entails matters
and (II)Legal
(In)Justice,
(In)Juries,
Baldwin,
R.
Joseph
&
O'Connell
cal research. See Jeffrey
(2002) (citing
n.42
433
425,
REV.
L.
Blame: Tort Law as Melodrama-orIs It Farce?, 50 UCLA
ACCIDENTS 45-49
BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL

(2000)).
33. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 100.
optimism).
34. Id. at 101 (noting that positive moods tend to increase an individual's
more risk
plaintiffs
make
may
they
betting,
to
likened
be
can
claims
35. However, if tort
on peomood
positive
of
effect
general
averse. Id. at 101. Professor Mitchell states that "[tihe
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Negative-feeling people naturally tend to be pessimistic. 36 A negatively disposed person might well settle early for less than is deserved.
Particularly strong emotions-which could be expected in the highly
charged atmosphere of malpractice claims-can overwhelm people
and make them feel that they are prone to act against their interests. 37
It is not difficult to imagine an upset malpractice claimant "damning
the torpedoes." Emotions play so prominent a role in settlement negotiations that Vanderbilt University Law School Professor Chris
Guthrie argues that many plaintiffs negotiate partially to avoid feelings of regret, rather than solely to maximize expected value. 38 Important also is that the plaintiff will normally have only one serious
tort claim in a lifetime, whereas defense personnel will deal with
many. 39 Although insurance company decisionmakers are human too,
their "skin is not in the game" the way a plaintiff's is, and they are
highly likely to be less emotional about paying than victims are about
being paid. Although Professor Mitchell limits the scope of his article
to individuals, it stands to reason that aggregates of persons with different temperaments-as one would expect in the corporate decisionmaking context-would dilute the influence of any single person's
idiosyncratic emotions. All in all, it seems reasonable to propose that
a team of insurance company decisionmakers suffer less from emotional distortions in judgment than an individual injured tort victim.
Keep in mind in this connection that personal injury lawyers often
practice without partners or with comparatively few of them. 40 Thus,
pie's betting is to decrease their willingness to bet in situations where potential losses are great."
Id. (citing Thomas E. Nygren et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in
Risk
Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather than Probability,
66
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 59, 69 (1996)).
36. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 101 ("[Overall,] a person in a negative mood is more likely
to
evaluate ambiguous evidence negatively and draw more negative inferences than a person
in a
positive mood.").
37. Id. at 102 ("Intense emotions may even substantially disrupt ordinary cognitive processes
to the point at which people feel as if they have lost control of themselves and are simply being
driven by prevailing emotional states even against their own self-interest.").
38. Id. at 103-04 (citing Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion
Theory
of Litigation, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 44-45).

39. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 215 (analyzing the problems in "a market dominated
by
one-time claimants").
40. See Ted Schneyer, Empirical Research with a Policy Payoff-Market Dynamics for Lawyers
Who Represent Plaintiffs for a Contingent Fee, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1833 (2002). Schneyer
notes:
For lawyers specializing in plaintiff's work, the financial risk is especially acute. As
Daniels and Martin point out, plaintiff's lawyers represent clients who are unlikely to
bring them other kinds of business in the event of a downturn in contingent-fee work.
Moreover, most specialists in the field-eighty-one percent of the lawyers Daniels and
Martin surveyed-are sole practitioners or practice in very small firms.
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even if a lawyer representing a tort victim client was less emotionally
involved than the client, the lawyer and the client are still only usually
to
two people (or at least very few), far less than one would expect
work on significant claims in an insurance company claims department. The lawyer and client together, while better than just the client
alone, are probably less emotionally diversified than corporate
decisionmakers.
Further, it would be unwise to be sanguine about the plaintiff's lawyer's dispassion or to overestimate counsel's ability to influence an
upset plaintiff. In his book recounting his career as a personal injury
lawyer, for example, then-Senator from North Carolina, John Edhow he became highly emotionwards went to great length to explain
41
cases.
clients'
his
ally invested in
It is hard to imagine the claims departments of Aetna, Allstate, or
St. Paul's allowing themselves to become so personally involved with
to
any particular claim. On balance, then, plaintiffs' lawyers are likely
inbe more emotional about medical malpractice and other personal
jury cases they work on than insurance company personnel working
on the same claims. This is not to deny that lawyers are often crucial

of the members of the
Id. See also id. at 1833 n.29 ("Similarly, a 1995 survey of a random sample
of plaintiffs' lawyers
two-thirds
that
revealed
(ATLA)
America
of
Lawyers
Trial
of
Association
Anyone Can Fall
Galanter,
Mark
(citing
lawyers."
fewer
practiced in firms comprised of five or
DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470-71
47
Discontents,
Its
and
Fee
Contingency
The
Manhole:
Down a
(1998))).
involvement in his trials.
41. Throughout his book, John Edwards writes about his emotional
completely entrusted
client
one
when
felt
he
scared
and
terrified
how
describes
he
For example,
TRIALS 6-7, 21
FOUR
AUCHARD,
JOHN
&
EDWARDS
his case to Edwards's judgment. JOHN
at least for him.,
that,
notes
He
16.
at
Id.
"calling."
his
as
lawsuit
one
describes
Edwards
(2004).
27. When defense lawyers
"these [personal injury legal] battles are never really abstract." Id. at
to" Edwards. Id.
attacked one of his clients in closing arguments, it was personally "infuriating
struggle between
a
as
characterized
is
hospital
a
and
at 47. A lawsuit between Edwards's client
dollar medical malpracmulti-million
a
reduced
judge
a
When
85.
83,
at
Id.
Goliath.
and
David
entire life." Id. at 112. Many
tice verdict, Edwards was as angry as he had ever been "in [his]
example, Jacob Fuchsberg,
For
emotionalism.
passionate
similar
exhibit
lawyers
plaintiffs'
other
a renowned plaintiffs' lawyer before becoming a judge, once said:
good lawyer. When a
When you say a [person] is objective, you are not describing a
I've come to know the
because
with,
settle
to
hard
I'm
trial,
to
come
to
about
is
case
what the case was
people, not just the file. There may have been an estimate of
people.
worth-which I concurred in superficially-but now I know the
THE LAWYERS WIN 147 (1979). Another
JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT Lo'rERY: ONLY
to visit his clients' homes, eat dinner with
used
Julien,
Alfred
one-time leading plaintiffs' lawyer,
the words of colleague Norman Sheresky,
in
so,
done
had
Julien
friends.
their
become
and
them,
"simply so that he can feel closer to them and ... more immersed in their causes. The deeper the
to communicate with the jury."
relationship he develops the easier it seems for him, he believes,
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in effectuating settlements (they are), 42 nor that lawyers are different
than clients (they are); it is only to say that defendant insurance companies probably suffer less from emotional cognitive biases than
highly emotionally invested personal injury attorneys. Ultimately, the
buck stops with clients, anyway. The people making the final decisions are not the supposedly more cool-headed lawyers but the (often)
upset claimants to whose decisions lawyers are ethically bound to
defer.
Professor Mitchell also points out that accountability can greatly affect decisionmakers: "The situational variable with perhaps the most
far-reaching effects on judgment and decisionmaking behavior ... is
the degree to which a decisionmaker is held accountable for his or her
decisions. Accountable and unaccountable decisionmakers often act
differently. '43 This is not to say that accountability is a panacea for
cognitive biases or that all people react the same way to every type of
accountability; however, in some situations, accountability ameliorates
cognitive biases by encouraging self-criticism and reexamination.4
Individual tort plaintiffs can look only to themselves, but corporate
(and therefore insurance company) employees at every level are disciplined by the market appraising their services. Since intra- and intercompany markets hold insurance company employees accountable,
these markets discipline insurance company decisionmakers and reduce the effect of their cognitive biases by inducing self-criticism and
reexamination. They have at least the possibility of mitigating some
biases and improving their performance in appraising the value of
claims. But plaintiffs are not held responsible to any outside competition and lack even the possibility of this type of judgment-enhancing
accountability. If plaintiffs fail to appraise the true value of their
claims, no competitive market for plaintiffs exists to hold a plaintiff
accountable.
Even if accountability does not significantly correct the biases of
any given insurance company employee on any given claim, a corporate decisionmaker who routinely fails can still be replaced with someone more successful. Indeed, whole companies that fail to see the
difference between strong and weak tort claims can be driven out of
business by superior competition. Because personal injury claims generally cannot be sold (except to the defendant), any failure of plaintiffs, no matter how egregious, to appraise the value of their claims
42. See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement:
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REV. 77 (1997).
43. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 110.
44. Id. at 111-12.
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can never result in the substitution of a new and more successful decisionmaker. Again, plaintiffs are accountable only to themselves,
which means, in effect, plaintiffs are not technically accountable at
45
all.
Nor does the assistance of a lawyer sufficiently counterbalance the
plaintiff's lack of accountability, which in fact seems to underscore another problem with plaintiffs' capacity to appraise their claims. The
plain fact is plaintiffs' attorneys also are not all that accountable to
46 True, plaintiffs
outside markets or, realistically, even to their clients.
47
generally have the legal right to dismiss their lawyers. But the average plaintiff is scarcely in a position to monitor and control the more
knowledgeable lawyer. This releases the lawyer, as well, from much
outside accountability. Consider, for example, the almost complete
lack of disciplinary actions by'bar associations against personal injury
4 8 Much is
lawyers despite formidable evidence of unfair practices.
also made of the conflicts of interest between personal injury lawyers
and their clients, which can lead to an attorney to push for "the brass
ring," as opposed to accepting a certain and adequate settlement, or,
conversely, settling contrary to the client's interests in order to spend
much less time on the case and thereby receive a much higher per
hour return. 49 Markets do not appear to subject such lawyers to much
discipline because the market for personal injury lawyers (unlike the
market for insurance company decisionmakers) is simply not price
competitive.5 0 Because, then, insurance companies, in contrast, are
disciplined by market competition, they are strongly inclined to correct inaccurate biases or suffer punishment through competition. But
plaintiffs, answering to no one but themselves for their cognitive bi45. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 110 (noting that "[a]ccountability within the context of
judgment and choice refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to
justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to others" (citing Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E.
Tetlock, Accounting for the Effect of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999)). This
definition of accountability does not contemplate accountability to oneself. One could point to a
breadwinner/claimant's accountability to his/her dependents but it is scarcely comparatively
enforceable.
46. See O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 43-47. See also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text (observing that lawyers are rarely disciplined for their misconduct, and that the market for
contingent fee-financed litigation is not price competitive).
47. See, e.g., In re Lydig's Will, 187 N.E. 298, 298 (1933) ("A client has an absolute right to
discharge his attorney with or without cause at any time .... ").
48. See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the DisciplinarySystem: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1357 (1996).
49. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation:Is It PriceCompetitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 84 (2003).
50. Id.
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ases, are comparatively ill-equipped to make utility-maximizing decisions through outside accountability.
Note also that plaintiffs and their lawyers are under little if any constraint to moderate their claims for more than adequate payment,
whereas insurance company personnel are in general under some constraints to moderate their desire for less than adequate payment: Unlike claimants and their lawyers, for insurance personnel earning the
good will of the public is a factor (admittedly diluted by other considerations) in their claim practices. In other words, claimants and their
lawyers have no comparable incentive to win anyone's good will by
their restraint.
Also, insurance companies in every state are subject to regulatory
discipline for clearly improper behavior. 51 Since that discipline is by
no means always forthcoming, no outside regulatory control exists for
claimants and rarely, if ever, for their lawyers given the massive reluctance of either judges or bar associations to exert any discipline.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If one assumes that prompt, periodic payment of an injured claimants' net economic loss is generally optimal, then early offers statutes
properly allocate responsibility for making early offers to defendants
in malpractice and other personal injury claims. As previously noted,
defendants are normally companies that insure providers of goods and
services. They desire to maximize the value of their companies. The
early offers alternative extends to insurers an opportunity to maximize
their value by resolving claims before they reach expensive, uncertain,
and lengthy litigation. The price for avoiding the tort system is to pay
plaintiffs immediately for their net economic loss as it accrues-which
is a huge improvement for plaintiffs as a class over the current uncertainty, delay, and transaction costs. In the end, plaintiffs and defendants can both share the gains from exiting the current tort system.
In sum, the parties best suited to calculate the costs and benefits of
making statutorily defined early offers are corporate defendants. Defendants alone have sufficient incentive to distinguish meritorious
from non-meritorious claims. In addition, corporate entities probably
suffer less than injured tort victims from cognitive biases. By relying
on corporations-constrained by the statutory requirements of the
early offers plan-to compute the crucial calculations, in the aggregate and for a huge majority of individual complaints, both sides
benefit.
51. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 938-39 (1988).

